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BOOK REVIEW 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION by Bruce Ackerman. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. ix, 303. $4.95. 
Reviewed by John A. Humbach* 
As the country becomes more densely populated, the pressure in- 
creases for greater state intervention into decisions involving land 
use. Principally, this intervention takes one of two forms: Either the 
state acquires property rights in the land and then controls its use 
like any other owner of an interest in land, or the state makes rules 
limiting the freedom of private owners to control the use of their 
respective parcels. 
To private owners, the most striking difference between the two 
forms of state intervention is that the first (property-acquisition) 
constitutionally requires a payment to the person from whom the 
property is taken, while the second (rule-making) does not require 
payment.' This difference is obviously important from the private 
owner's point of view. If the state must make payments to a partic- 
ular property owner, the taxes paid by all property owners .may be 
higher as a result. On the other hand, if such payments are not made 
to the owners of the land which is the subject of state intervention, 
they stand to lose much, unless the adverse effects to them are offset 
by other benefits of some sort. 
Of course, the offsetting benefits need not be in cash. For exam- 
ple, when the state intervenes by rule-making, a loss of land-use 
potential may be more than compensated by the advantage of hav- 
ing one's neighbors subject to the same new  restriction^.^ However, 
this type of compensation is more problematic because its "worth" 
* B.A. 1963, M i m i  University (Ohio); J.D. 1966, Ohio State; Professor of Law, PG 
University School of Law. 
1. The requirement of compensation for takings of property by the federal government 
is based upon the "just compensation" clause of the fsth amendment to the Constitution: 
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compenaation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The requirement has also been made applicable to the states, and comparable 
requirements are of course a part of most if not (by interpretation) all state constitutions. 
See NICHOLS, EMINENT DO- 68.1[2](1976). 
2. It is not meant to suggest that any sort of parity is required between value lost and 
value gained, or indeed that any requirements a t  all of the "just compensation" clause 
necessarily apply to rule-making interventions. However, the possibility of "built-in" offsets 
can be understood as one justification for denying cash compensation in cases of rule-making. 
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to the recipient is far less certain than a sum of money. Thus, when 
the state intervenes in land use decisions, the affected owners are 
likely to want money. But money is only available if there has been 
a "&king" of "property" within the meaning of the Con~titution.~ 
Hence, what is and what is not such a "taking" is a very important 
question. 
It is perhaps surprising then that many observers consider the 
question to have been poorly answered in judicial decisions applying 
the "just compensation" clause of the Con~titution.~ Led by the 
articles of Sax5 and Mi~haelman,~ a number of attempts recently 
have been made to provide some sensible basis for determining 
when just compensation is or ought to be required. The method has 
tended to be less descriptive than prescriptive: the author first de- 
velops a model of just-compensation law, rational and coherent to 
his satisfaction, and then critically evaluates the existing law in 
terms of his model. 
Now, Bruce Ackerman has come forward with what is clearly 
calculated to be a major contribution to the debate. However, the 
debate to which he contributes is less clear. For rather than attempt 
to resolve the just compensation controversy, or to tie off some of 
its loose ends, he seems to take off in the headlong pursuit of an 
entirely different inquiry: What is the proper methodology for courts 
to use in selecting rules for the adjudication of cases? 
He correctly notes that the style of decisionmaking almost nec- 
essarily affects the outcome of a decision.' However, if the rationali- 
zation of just compensation law must await a general (and correct) 
agreement of how courts should decide cases, the wait may be long 
indeed. Presumably, Ackerman did not intend such a pessimistic 
conclusion, for the tone of the book is, in large part, quite the 
opposite. What he apparently did intend was to portray in fair 
detail two basic approaches to deciding just compensation 
cases-one contrived and essentially untried, and the other histori- 
cally predominant. The contrived mode of decision is described by 
3. For quotation of relevant language of Constitution, see note 1 supra. 
4 .  See note 1 supra. 
5 .  Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). 
6. Michaelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
7. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 21-22 (1977) (hereinafter 
cited as ACKERMAN). 
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Ackerman as Scientific Policymaking; the historically predominent 
mode is called Ordinary Obser~ing.~ The two rest.their claims to 
validity on quite different philosophical underpinnings. Hence, the 
choice between them becomes a question of one's own philosophy 
about such things. Ackerman's own preference for Scientific Policy- 
making, if it  is not immediately clear from the names which he has 
selected for the two approaches, certainly becomes clear a short 
distance into his analysis. 
In distinguishing between judges who are Scientific Policymak- 
ers and those who are Ordinary Observers, the test is whether the 
judge has committed himself to a kind of political-legal 
Weltanschauung, referred to by Ackerman as a Comprehensive 
 vie^.^ To qualify as a Scientific Policymaker, "one must learn to 
think of the legal system as if i t  were organized around a self- 
consistent [and fairly small] set of abstract principles that com- 
prise the system's Comprehensive View."lo Thus, the Scientific Poli- 
cymakers start by selecting a Comprehensive View and then pro- 
ceed to decide cases in accordance with it. On the other hand, the 
Ordinary Observer, who sees social reality as too complex for any 
single normative view, seeks to apply the various norms which ap- 
pear to correspond to existing social expectations.ll In short, the 
Ordinary Observer tries to decide cases the way that most people 
would expect him to decide them.12 
The most appealing aspect of the Scientific Policymaker's 
methodology is that it  purports to bring, via the Comprehensive 
8. See id. a t  10-22. 
9. Ackerman recognizes the possibility of a diversity of possible Comprehensive Views 
and does not make the adherence to any particular View a test of whether one is a Scientific 
Policymaker or an Ordinary Observer. See id. a t  11. 
10. Id. a t  90. (Emphasis deleted). See id. a t  11 and especially id. a t  197-98, n. 21 for a 
discussion of the idea that a Comprehensive View should involve a "relatively small" number 
of abstract and general principles. 
11. Id. a t  12-15. 
12. The other difference between Ordinary Observers and Scientific Policymakers, or 
between Ordinary and Scientific decisionmakers in general, concerns the matter of vocabu- 
lary. Thus, an Ordinary decisionmaker will prefer resort to ordinary (non-lawyer) talk for an 
understanding of the meanings of words, whereas a Scientific decisionmaker will regard such 
resort "as the surest sign of muddle." See id. a t  10-11. For the legal Scientist, a sophisticated 
body of legal conceptions can be expressed only with a rather closely defined set of terminol- 
ogy, and the fact that such terminology happens to have homonyms in ordinary talk is a 
matter of no relevance to their legal meanings. See id. a t  26-28. 
For example, Ackerman emphasizes the distinction between "social" property and 
"legal" property. The former is property as understood by the layman, while "legal" property 
is a term of art applicable to some of the legal relationships recognized to exist between people 
with respect to things. See id. a t  26-29, 116-18. 
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View, a self-consistency and philosophical justifiability to the law 
which common law casuistry seems to lack. But the key question of 
exactly how the Scientific Policymaker should select the Compre- 
hensive View which will monocratically govern us all is one which 
Ackerman frankly avoids.13 He does 'specify that i t  is the state's 
Comprehensive View, not the individual judge's, which should be 
controlling.14 Beyond this we are told nothing explicitly,15 though we 
are given a hint. In his apology for demurring on this point, we are 
told that we have "a most remarkable scene" to consider merely by 
looking at  the "powerful forces in our present legal culture-to ex- 
plore the basic tensions in our existing legal system through an 
exploration of the compensation clause of our existing Constitu- 
tion."l8 In context, the implication is that a suitable Comprehensive 
View is likely to be found in the rich diversity of our existing consti- 
tutional heritage. The hint is, however, confusing. In selecting the 
Comprehensive View, he seems to suggest that the Scientific Policy- 
maker act pretty much like an Ordinary Observer. 
Following Ackerman's lead, and putting aside the central issue 
of how to select the operative Comprehensive View, we may wonder 
whether there is any conceivable Comprehensive View which might 
reasonably be expected to find acceptability in American legal cir- 
cles17 and also plausibly account for a system of just compensation 
rules. Ackerman offers Comprehensive Views of two kinds, which he 
calls Utilitarian and Kantian.18 Because both of these general cate- 
gories offer endless possibilities for specific, actual views,19 Acker- 
man wisely avoids defining either of them too closely. Thus, Utili- 
tarianism is represented as the philosophy dedicated to maximizing 
"something-or-another-that-sounds-like-So~ial-Utility.~'~~ Kantian 
13. Id. a t  41. It is somewhat disconcerting that he ducks the issue, given the havoc 
which misplaced ideological commitments have caused in this century alone. 
14. Id. a t  182. 
15. Implicitly, I think, Ackerman shows substantial partiality towards a t  least one or 
the other, perhaps an amalgam, of the two Comprehensive Views which he deals with in detail 
in the book. See text accompanying notes 20 and 21 infra for a brief summary of the two. 
In any case, he pays no attention to the theocratic Comprehensive View despite its 
important historical following, nor to the View which holds that "private property is theftw-a 
view which was the late specter haunting Europe. See K. MARX and F. ENGELS, COMMUNIST 
MANIPESTO 1, 80-86 (Washington Sq. Press Ed. 1964). Adoption of the latter Comprehensive 
View would make easy work of the "just compensation" conundrum. 
16. ACKERMAN a t  42 (Emphasis in original). 
17. See id. a t  86. 
18. Id. a t  41-42 & 71-72. 
19. Id. a t  42 & 71. 
20. Id. a t  42. 
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philosophies are those which accept the Principle of Exploitation: 
people are not merely the means to the end of maximizing Social 
Utility but are, instead, ends in themselves-in short, there are 
things which are "wrong" to do to a person no matter how much 
good would result to others or to society in general.21 From these 
scant definitions, Ackerman adumbrates the two different Scientific 
systems of just compensation rules which they would respectively 
imply. 
In reading the demonstration of how Scientific Policymaking 
might work based first upon Utilitarian, then the Kantian Compre- 
hensive Views, there is little that will be strange to anyone who has 
read Michaelman's 1967 article on the ~ubject~~-little that is 
strange, that is, other than the vocabulary. It is somewhat like 
reading a familiar poem in a recently learned foreign language. 
- In fairness, Ackerman's stated objective was to "develop a tech- 
nical v~cabulary"~~ to deal with "the fundamental substantive prob- 
lems raised by the compensation clause, as they are seen by contem- 
porary Legal Science."" But the question still remains whether all 
that new vocabulary is necessary to illuminate the main distinction 
in his thesis-between Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policy- 
making. 
One particularly wonders about the effort to identify and label 
the various ways in which judges may either be "restrained" or 
"innovative" in reaching their decisions: conservative vs. 
re formi~t ,~~ deferential vs. activist,26 or principled vs. pragmat i~ t .~  
Of course, these fundamental differences in the ways judges view 
their own roles can affect decisions, and the resulting effects can be 
just as radical as differences in the judge's Comprehensive View. 
21. Id. a t  72. 
22. Michaelman, note 6 supra. A good deal of the work of Sax, note 5 supra, is also 
recounted. ACKERMAN a t  50-56. 
23. ACKERMAN a t  25. 
24. Id. a t  26. Also, in fairness, Ackerman acknowledges a t  great length his indebtedness 
to Michaelman. See id. a t  209, where he admits that his "scholarly tokens do not measure 
the full compensation that would be due in a well-ordered academy." 
To his vast credit, Ackerman does not, like so many legal scholars, plod to rediscover 
the wheel, "proceeding as if the legal world were forever new." Id. 
25. With regard to wealth distribution, a "conservative" would tend to favor the status 
quo, and a "reformist" would see the need for some redistribution. Id. a t  37. 
26. A "deferential" judge would have greater confidence in the legislature and other 
organs of government and hence defer to them more often than the freely second-guessing 
"activist." Id. 
27. The "pragmatic" judge would tend to favor litigants who are expected to  be sore 
losers. "Principled" judges would not. Id. a t  37-38. 
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Indeed, it is hard to understand how a person's view of the judicial 
role can be sensibly separated from his truly comprehensive Com- 
prehensive View.28 A Comprehensive View which does not compre- 
hend one's view of the judicial role is not really comprehensive at 
On the other hand, if there is any special relation between 
these political-science considerations and just compensation law as 
such, that relation is not clear. Indeed, Ackerman himself practi- 
cally drops the distinctions from further consideration when he 
moves on to his discussion of the Ordinary Observer approach.30 
Mainly, Ackerman uses his various restrainedlinnovative dis- 
tinctions to show that the statistical correlation between choice of 
Comprehensive View and outcome of cases may not be that great 
after all, i.e., the choice of Comprehensive View-at least as be- 
tween the two choices he discusses-is only one of several, and per- 
haps not even an especially important determinant of case out- 
comes. In doing so, however, Ackerman raises a point which should 
cause a t  least momentary distress to anyone convinced of the supe- 
riority of the Scientific Policymaking approach: there appears to be 
no practical Scientific way for individual judges to select between 
the competing models of the judicial role.31 Thus, every "Scientific" 
decision must be importantly affected (and hence infected) by a 
quite un-Scientific determinant. It is like developing a perfect sub- 
stantive law and then having the trials by battle. 
What, then, does the book tell us about "private property and 
the Constitution?" We learn first of all that the decided cases in the 
"just compensation" area do not seem to be reconcilable with any 
identifiable, broad, but strictly followed ideological commitment 
(Comprehensive View).32 We are also told that, if the courts deliber- 
ately and carefully did adhere to any one ideological commitment, 
the "just compensation" cases would be more c~ns i s t en t .~~  None of 
this is new, but singing the praises of Scientific Policymaking resur- 
rects a dangerous temptation that is very old: the temptation to 
sweep away the chaos of pluralism and replace it with the stream- 
lined efficiency of political monism. 
28. Cf. id. at 205, n. 2. 
29. Furthermore, it may be noted that one must have a Comprehensive View that 
accepts judges as Scientific Policymakers before one is in a logical position to consider what 
kind of Comprehensive View ought to underlie narrower policies. 
30. ACKERMAN at 106-10. 
31. Id. at 205, n. 2. 
32. Id. at 13. 
33. Id. at 11-15. 
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Inconsistency in our laws is a price we pay for tolerating politi- 
cal diversity. So long as there are variations in people's views (Com- 
prehensive Views or otherwise) there will be political diversity, and 
so long as we are unwilling to ascribe ultimate "correctness" to any 
particular view, such diversity must be permitted.34 Thus, it  does 
not signal an inadequacy in the judicial process that the "just com- 
pensation" cases (or any other body of cases) cannot be reconciled, 
but it  is a sign rather that access to our law-making process is open 
to all, including those who may have dissident or minority Compre- 
hensive Views. 
Ackerman no doubt correctly identifies the tendency in modern 
decisionmaking to seek the policies to be served by law outside the 
body of the law itself-a turn to purpose-oriented decisions, or re- 
turn to naturalism or, in any event, a turn away from the inward 
looking formalism of the preceding century. This looking outside the 
law for the law's policies is the essence of Policymaking. However, 
instead of seriously evaluating this trend or demonstrating its dan- 
gers (especially when combined with Ackerman's monistic version 
of "Science"), Ackerman seems to embrace i t  uncritically as the 
antidote to the unscientific "policy-following" approach of the fairly 
recent past. It may go too far to see Scientific Policymaking as a 
form of crypto-autocracy, but undoubtedly judicial dedication to a 
single Comprehensive View leaves little place for dissenters from 
that View. 
Apart from these substantive difficulties, two other matters 
should be mentioned. One is Ackerman's unconventional and some- 
times confusing use of capital letters. Certainly, when pains have 
been taken to define terms critical to an analysis, it  surely helps the 
reader if those terms are distinguished by capitals whenever they 
later appear.35 However, when a generic term, "Layman," is first 
defined as the name of a hypothetical person and then later is 
capitalized and used in its generic sense, the result is simply confus- 
ing.36 In contrast, certain words are capitalized for no apparent rea- 
son at  all-e.g., Highly Efficien~y,~~ Legal S c i e n ~ e , ~ ~  Law 
34. This last assertion reflects my Comprehensive View which holds that there is no 
"correct" Comprehensive View save, of course, that there is no "correct" Comprehensive 
View. 
35. Thus, there can be no quarrel with Ackerman's use of capitals for such terms as 
Ordinary, Scientific, Observer, and Policymaker, all carefully defined. ACKERMAN at 10-20. 
36. Compare ACKERMAN at 97, with, e.g., ACKERMAN at 123, 147 or 151. 
37. Id. at 11. 
38. Id. at 42 & 184. 
39. Id. at 26. 
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of Just Compen~ation,~~ Social Utility4' and Utilitarian42-giving the 
impression that they carry greater import than they in fact do. 
Another objection is that the book is used as a forum for airing 
non-germane viewpoints which are obviously dear to Ackerman but 
which offer little concerning the main subject matter. For example, 
Ackerman-who has been known to talk (privately) of the rights of 
fi~h~~-spends over two pages44 on the question of whether "well- 
socialized" laymen ought to be taught that "Nature" and 
"Tradition" have rights too. Although he ignores the intriguing 
question of whether local birds, foxes, etc. are entitled to be paid 
"just compensation" when a new dam floods their habitat, he does 
claim to have "come upon one of the deeper legal paradoxes" of the 
environmental revolution: the restoration of Nature to its proper 
place means the triumph of Ar t i f i~e .~~  Incidentally, as may be seen 
in the preceding usage of capitalization which follows that of the 
book, this is another area where Ackerman has had difficulty keep- 
ing his shift-key under control. 
All in all, however, the book is a t  the very least a handy recapi- 
tulation for anyone who wants to get a deeper understanding of the 
recent thinking about "just compensation" law. Certainly, watching 
Ackerman disappear into pitfalls will assist others to avoid them. 
But the book is perhaps most important for the insights which it 
offers concerning the more general sort of jurisprudence or political 
philosophy. The two become, in discussions such as these, very 
close. By identifying the Scientific Policymaking mode of deciding 
cases, he warns us of its dangers. By demonstrating some of the 
incongruities produced by Ordinary Observing, he has warned 
against being entirely satisfied with that approach to law as well. 
But what are we to choose? Scientific Observing? Ordinary 
Policymaking? Ackerman raises both of the possibilities but dis- 
misses them.46 Perhaps there really is no fully satisfactory approach. 
Some, however, may be worse than others. 
40. Id. a t  29. 
41. Id. a t  42. 
42. Id. a t  144 & 172. 
43. As reported in a letter to this reviewer dated September 7, 1977 from Stephen P. 
Dresch, Research Director of the Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies, Inc., 
confirming earlier conversations. 
44. ACKERMAN a t 155-56 & 262-64. 
45. Id. a t  156. 
46. Id. a t  17-20. 
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